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When building borders aims at increasing the efficiency of  railways: the creation of  the French 
track owner (mid-1990s – mid-2000s)
Arnaud Passalacqua (Université Paris Diderot, France)
T2M 2013 conference in Kouvola/St. Petersburg
As a member of  the European Union, France has been constrained to deeply reform its railway system,  
after the adoption of  the famous directive 91/440, in 1991. This text imposed to build an accounting 
border between the activity of  transport and the management of  the infrastructure and opened the way 
to various national solutions adopted by the members.
The French reform was decided in 1997, after 2 years of  social and political tensions. The historical  
national operator, the SNCF1 lost its monopoly in the field of  railways with the creation of  RFF 2, a 
public agency which became the owner of  the rail track and was also given the colossal railway debt of 
about €2012 26 billions. By the way, France decided to go further than the requirement of  the European 
directive and adopted an odd structure for the sector of  railways. However, despite the creation of  this 
new agency, the border with the historical operator is not so tight. The main factor of  porosity has  
been inscribed in the law itself:  the SNCF has been given a monopoly on the maintenance of  the 
existing network, under the responsibility of  RFF.
This paper proposes to discuss the nature of  the border that has been then implemented between the 
SNCF and RFF and to understand the reasons behind the choices that were made in a very specific 
socio-political context. If  on the European level, the long-term aim was to enable an open access to 
new railway operators in order to reduce costs and prices, this idea was not so clear in the national  
context, where the problem of  the debt was much more important and the right-wing government did 
not want to get involved in a new strike after a very long conflict in November-December 1995.
The border reflects these various factors. It is first a financial separation, between both structures but 
also between the world of  railways and the budget of  the French State, constrained, at that time, to  
rigorous criterion imposed by the Maastricht treaty.
Of  course it is also a physical border mainly between the infrastructure and the stations which have 
been kept by the SNCF. These physical aspects of  the new border were not the easiest to define and 
were only solved about 10 years after the reform. The slowness of  the process produced a new kind of 
no-man’s lands, a typical figure of  border problems: unused rail lands had to wait for a clarification 
before they could be reused for other urban purposes.
The border is also a cultural one. Since the reform, the SNCF has been engaged into a movement of 
deep change.  The former values of  technical  leadership and public  utility  have been progressively 
combined with new values, such as commercial attitude and on-line modernity. For its part, RFF has  
tried to build a new culture besides the old culture of  railway workers, based on the diversity of  its  
increasing staff  composed of  civil servants, railway workers and private sector employees.
Finally,  this border has also a temporal dimension.  One of  the main points was to change lots of  
practices  in  the  world  of  railway,  particularly  on the  profitability  of  investments  and the national 
management of  local transport services.
This paper is based on oral archives already collected and new investigations on the specific problem of  
1 Société nationale des chemins de fer français.
2 Réseau ferré de France.
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the ownership sharing between the SNCF and RFF3.
 1  The 1997 reform of  French railways
 1.1  A traumatic situation for French railways
In  1995,  France  lived  one  of  the  most  important  strikes  of  the  XXth century.  The  right-wing 
government, led by Prime Minister Alain Juppé, under the rule of  recently elected President Jacques  
Chirac, proposed a controverted reform of  pensions. After decades of  growth, the ageing of  baby-
boomers imposed to revise the social system organized after World War II. But the propositions made 
by the government faced a hard opposition of  the main left-wings trade unions, particularly the idea of  
increasing the working period from 37.5 years to 40 years for civil servants and employees enjoying a  
special  pension  regime,  such  as  railway  workers.  They  quickly  became  the  main  icons  of  the 
demonstrations and strikes that blocked the country in November-December 1995.
This specific situation can be explained by the tensions that were already to observe between the State 
and the monopolistic railway company, the SNCF. Negotiations on a planning document for the 1996-
2000 period were hard, with the perspective of  cost reductions and possible line closures. Rumours 
about these projects were published by various newspapers and quickly denounced by opponents.
The solidarity that seemed to support the strike despite its major impacts on the French economy and  
the daily life led the government to reduce its ambitions and eventually to renounce to the planning  
document. The president of  the SNCF was constrained to resign. Trade unions could enjoy a major 
victory, despite their rivalry and the differences between their positions.
The most surprising point is that this traumatic situation led, two years after, to the major reform of  
French railways after that of  1937, which had given birth to the SNCF. The convergence of  various 
reasons behind the highly visible 1995 strike explains this quick change.
 1.2  A convergence of  reasons behind a reform
First, after the strike, the new president of  the SNCF, Loïk Le Floch Prigent, deliberately impulsed a 
new dynamics in this old State-owned company, by shaking the old habits. He decided to revise the  
organization and to renew the staff,  with a  specific  focus on customers,  incomes and profitability, 
which were new concepts in such a company. On the internal point of  view he opened new paths for 
social  dialogue  between  the  management  and  the  employees.  Le  Floch  Prigent  was  eventually  
constrained to resign after only 6 months, because of  his involvement in a financial scandal, when he  
was head of  the oil company Elf-Aquitaine. But his successor, Louis Gallois, followed the main lines of 
his policy.
Le Floch Prigent had understood that the 1995 strike revealed a disease of  the company. Beside the  
problems of  social dialogue and the fall of  traffic due to the economic crisis of  the 1990s, the main 
difficulty faced by the SNCF was its increasing debt. The historical railway debt had been recently 
increased by the  high-speed train program decided by  the  State  and realized and operated  by the  
company. New high-speed lines had been expensive and public authorities had mainly let the SNCF pay 
for their building and operation, whereas the decision processes were more complex. Last point, the 
maintenance of  the network was underestimated by the State so that the SNCF registered a deficit on  
3 This paper is an English working version with a new perspective of  a French paper: Passalacqua (A.), “La réforme 
ferroviaire française de 1997 : une histoire à rebondissements pour un scénario original”, Revue d'histoire des chemins de fer, 
forthcoming. Precise references are given in the original version. For any question, please send an e-mail to 
arnaud.passalacqua@m4x.org.
2
this  central  activity.  For  the  suburban  transport,  the  company  was  also  in  doubt  because  of  the  
unexpectedly high cost of  the Eole project, a new regional train under Paris. The railway debt was  
about 46 billion €2012, with 41 billion €2012 directly inscribed in the balance of  the SNCF.
The faith in high-speed had probably to be rethought because of  this economic failure. 20 years of 
railway development were to revise and what had been considered a major success of  the French 
railways appeared as a drawback of  the system. The only positive dynamics in the mid-1990s was the 
development  of  regional  trains  outside  the  Paris  area  :  regional  authorities  appeared  as  potential 
financial partners in this activity of  the company.
Two external constraints were also taken into consideration by actors. First the  91/440 directive of  the  
European Union. This important text imposed to distinguish the accounting of  the railway operation 
and  the  accounting  of  the  network  operation  within  every  national  frame.  The  historical  railway  
operators  had  to  reorganize  themselves  in  order  to  be  conformed  to  this  prescription.  Different 
solutions were invented by countries, but in the middle of  the 1990s, only half  of  the State-members  
had done such a reform. For instance, Germany had chosen to create a holding, DB AG, with the two 
activities, the operation for the different DB subsidiaries and the network management for DB Netz.  
By the way, the German State had taken the burden of  the German railway debt, a transfer which was 
allowed by the 91/440 directive. France had not engaged in such a process yet but was expected to do 
so by the authorities in Brussels.
The other external constraint was due to the implications of  the Maastricht treaty of  1992: in order to  
be integrated to the project of  common currency, every State-member had to follow rigorous economic 
criterion on its national budget. The national debt could not exceed 60% of  the gross national product.  
France was exactly around this limit and the national debt was then a critical point in the national  
policy. The French State could not take the railway debt on its own budget.
 1.3  A reform despite the government and then applied by its opponents
Before explaining what has been the reform itself, a focus has to be made on the actors themselves. It is 
striking to consider that the most important reform of  French railways of  the second half  of  the XX th 
century has been done more or less against all implied actors. First, the Prime Minister did not want to  
have any problems with the world of  railways, after the traumatic strike of  1995. He did not want to be 
implied in any railway considerations any more. The Minister of  Planning, Transport,  Housing and 
Tourism, Bernard Pons, was an old-school gaulliste, likely to consider Brussels as a threat to the national 
independence.  A friend of  Chirac,  he was not looking for a  big reform in order to guarantee his  
political career. For the transport affairs, he had decided to let Anne-Marie Idrac, his Secretary of  State,  
work alone. With a strong technical background in town planning and transport policy and being new 
in the political landscape, Idrac was the only member of  the government likely to be interested in the 
field of  railways.
The political opposition was composed of  various forces, after the historical defeats of  the socialist 
party in 1993 and 1995. On the field of  transport and after the 1995 strike, the communist party was 
particularly active and enjoyed a high visibility, with the figure of  an ex-railway worker, Jean-Claude  
Gayssot,  representative  of  a  Parisian  working-class  suburb.  The  proximity  with  the  CGT4,  the 
important  left-wing  trade  union,  explained  that  Gayssot  could  enjoy  a  self-confidence  in  railway  
matters,  thanks to the  victory obtained mainly  by the CGT over  the government  during the 1995 
conflict. During the discussion of  the reform project, Gayssot was the main opponent with a strong  
discourse.
4 Confédération générale du travail.
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The surprise came when Chirac decided to change the assembly of  representatives and when the left-
wing coalition won the election, with Gayssot as new Minister of  Planning, Transport and Housing. 
Being in charge of  the sector of  railways and after 18 months of  opposition to the reform that the 
previous government had nearly not really implemented before the elections, Gayssot seemed to be 
able to go back to the old system. But, another surprise was that his political line was eventually to  
lightly adapt the reform by keeping its main principles: he let the reform find its place in the sector of 
railways, in apparent contradiction to his previous discourses.
Despite the wind of  change produced by Le Floch Prigent, few of  the SNCF managers were in favour 
of  a reform that seemed to reduce the fields of  action of  the company, by giving the network to a new  
authority, and to prepare the opening of  railway markets to new operators, whereas the SNCF was not  
perceived as a competitive company.
In this context, only few people were strong support of  a reform. Mainly Claude Martinand, a State  
engineer with a left-wing political background. After the 1995 strike, in order to reflect on the long-
term future of  railways, Martinand was asked by the government to write a report, that finally gave  
birth to a draft law. Himself  and the few people around him were sufficiently persuasive in order to 
convince Idrac and her staff  to begin a reform of  railways. And then Pons, that is to say Chirac. The  
reform was finally adopted in February 1997. The new State agency RFF was created with a double  
burden: the major part of  the railway debt and the railway network. By the way, the reform mainly 
consisted in building borders.
 2  Building borders in a unified world
 2.1  A border for the French State
On the financial question, the reform was conceived as a border between the world of  railways and the  
French State. Things had historically been really confused on that point. The first century of  railways 
had been dominated by private companies operating lines built within a national frame adopted in 1842. 
In a context of  economic crisis, a left-wing government decided of  the nationalisation of  railways with  
the creation of  the SNCF in 1937. Since then, railways had been a public concern. The SNCF had  
developed a specific relationship with the State, particularly on financial questions. The State gave a 
yearly contribution to the budget of  the operator and could guide the investments, but let the SNCF 
manage the railway debt. Since 1937, a long-established process of  imbrications had developed.
The  1997  reform had  the  ambition  to  change  the  rules,  by  defining  new borders.  The  first  one 
distinguishes the State and the world of  railways: by transferring the debt to a new agency, RFF, the 
State did not take it itself. By the way, the criterion imposed by Maastricht could be respected, even if  
this agency is a public one. To do so, the rule imposed that RFF had to find 50% of  its resources out 
of  the State subventions. Conceived as a mainly independent entity, RFF was not really the State any  
more. That is why the reform created a railway toll system: operators would pay in order to use the 
network held by RFF. And the monopolistic – at that time – SNCF would finance the resources of 
RFF. The fact that the State owned 100 % of  the SNCF and that, finally, public entities paid to others 
in order to comply with the Maastricht obligations did not appear as a patch-up job but was considered  
a good preparation for the opening of  successive railway markets, due to happen within the next years. 
A first border is here clearly to notice.
Another one implied the State: the reform imposed to RFF to guarantee any investment with a minimal  
profitability.  Whereas  the  previous  investments  made  by  the  SNCF  under  the  rule  of  the  State,  
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particularly in high-speed lines, were hardly profitable, and that the State had finally to face the financial 
problem, the 1997 reform imposed a new border which intended to preserve the State from any new 
deficit linked to railway investments.
 2.2  A porous border inscribed in law
Another problem of  border was to define the link between RFF and the SNCF. A first point was a 
consequence of  the idea of  railway toll:  the SNCF would have to pay an annual toll for using the 
network.  But the system had to find another factor in order to preserve an equilibrium. The idea  
inscribed in the 1997 law was to keep the SNCF manage the maintenance of  the railway network, even 
if  the operator was not its owner any more. RFF would pay the historical operator in order to keep its  
own network in good condition. Almost for the existing network; for new lines, RFF would have the 
choice of  the organization of  maintenance. With such a system, the SNCF could be paid for that work  
and financial flows between RFF and SNCF could be more or less in equilibrium. In other words, the 
border defined by the law was very porous and both actors were still intrinsically linked.
 2.3  A border between past and present
With the spatial borders addressed in the last part of  the paper, the last important kind of  border  
introduced by the reform is a temporal border. 1997 is conceived as the beginning of  a new era, with  
new rules in the world of  railways. By such a construction, the French State admitted that the previous 
situation  was  problematic  and agreed  to  clear  it,  in  the  limits  of  its  own possibility,  imposed  by  
Maastricht. The new system, based on the existence of  a new agency in charge of  the most important  
part of  the debt, intended to be also a new birth for the historical operator. With deep changes in the  
management, the SNCF was also confronted to a new landscape, where the problem of  the debt was  
replaced by the arrival of  new competitors.
 3  Questions of  borders
 3.1  Borders to promote mobility: an efficient paradox?
The  creation  of  these  various  borders  had  various  purposes  but  the  most  visible  one  was  the 
compliance with the 91/440 directive of  the European Union. Among the goals  of  the European 
Commission,  the  opening  of  railway  markets  to  competition  has  progressively  become  the  most 
important, with successive decisions concerning the different markets (international rail traffic, freight 
traffic, passengers traffic) during the 2000s years. The harmonization of  driving licenses and the right  
of  passengers and the definition of  a global interoperability policy supported the creation of  European 
railway markets with multiple operators, with more or less success.
In the French frame, the borders between RFF and the SNCF was supposed to be a guarantee of  the  
equity between operators. RFF acted as a promoter of  new operators, by selling them the best railway 
slots, particularly on the freight market. The border was more than a neutral line, it was also a political  
tool. Despite this configuration, the opening of  the freight was eventually limited. In this competition, 
the  SNCF also used its  own weapons,  such as the pressure that  such an operator  could apply  on 
disseminated industrial customers. The general context of  a decreasing market also explains the modest 
role played by new operators.
This example shows that the border between the SNCF and RFF must be seen as a highly sensitive  
zone. This is clearly confirmed when considering the spatial dimension of  the border.
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 3.2  Ownership sharing after the reform : 10 years of  tensions for sovereignty
Ownership sharing between both entity has been a major problem during the 10 first years of  their 
cohabitation. The 1997 law and the following decrees had addressed the important question of  the 
ownership of  railway territories. The network itself  has been given to RFF, as the new owner of  the  
tracks. The question of  stations, depots or housings was more complex. For instance, the SNCF did 
not want to loose its huge number of  housings, an important tool for providing interesting conditions 
to the railway workers. The importance of  stations was crucial for the historical operator, but also for  
the new agency, in a foreseeable context of  opening to new operators.
The law decided that the SNCF should keep the stations and its housings, RFF being the owner of  the 
platforms, except for those perpendicular to the tracks, and the accesses to the platforms. The depots  
were also kept by the SNCF, which was a major advantage in the competition to come.
These theoretical distinctions had to be analysed more precisely and that explains the difficulties of  the 
operation of  ownership sharing. First, the SNCF did not exactly know its own estate. Some ownership 
problems had not been solved since the merger of  the previous private companies in 1937. Being its  
own insurance company, the SNCF had not a real pressure on that point. The poor knowledge of  the  
estate was a first problem in the sharing. But, of  course, the company knew most of  its territories and 
buildings and managed to give to RFF the most problematic assets and to keep the most interesting  
ones. A national commission for ownership sharing was created in 1998 in order to prepare decisions  
on the thousands of  cases discussed. Its work lasted till 2006 and the government finally imposed to  
RFF and the  SNCF to  find  definitive  agreements.  The  stakes  were  enhanced by  the  fact  that  an  
important  part  of  the  discussed  estates  were  strategic  surfaces  in  urban centres.  Local  authorities 
generally wanted to have new projects on these territories that were no more of  use for the railway  
services, but the ownership problems delayed any operations. In a context of  promotion of  urban 
density, particularly around stations, this situation was unbearable for other actors. Borders had to be 
well defined.
 3.3  Cultural borders: toward an increased porosity of  the French world of  railway
The last border addressed by the 1997 reform may be the most important in the long term: the cultural 
evolution of  the world of  railways. Whereas the reform has generally built new borders, on the cultural 
point of  view, its effects will probably abolish an old established border between the world of  railway 
and the rest of  the world. The iconic figures of  railwaymen working with steam engines and the very  
specific conditions of  work generally applied by railway companies, combined with strong internal links 
due to the structure of  network characterizing this industry, explain the historical coherence and even a 
feeling of  self-sufficiency of  this industry. In the French frame as in many others, the constitution of  a  
national monopolistic operator strengthened this feeling. So that even the State, which was supposed to  
control the activity and the financial results of  the company, was often not really able to access to the 
data: the weight of  the SNCF contributed to the existence of  a State within the State.
The 1997 reform has slightly changed the situation, by breaking the monopoly of  the SNCF not on 
railway operation but in the world of  railways. RFF, as a new railway agency, has built another pole,  
even if  its staff  is still about 1% of  the staff  of  the SNCF. But, RFF has chosen to recruit people of  
different origins and not only railway workers. At the beginning of  the agency, the staff  was divided 
between three kind of  workers: railway workers coming from the SNCF, civil servants and employees  
of  private companies. Some of  the railway workers had probably been sent by the SNCF in order to 
have a look at the new structure, but most of  them decided to join RFF in order to make possible  
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projects that they could not achieve within the SNCF. Civil servants had generally a strong experience  
in the field of  railways or transport, but found in RFF a way to have a new weight in the negotiations  
with the  historical  operator.  And people  coming from private  companies  were  important  for  new 
activities organized by RFF, such as the management of  the debt, which required specific knowledge in 
finance, and the management of  real estate, with an important activity of  selling and negotiations on 
urban projects.
As a result, the world of  railway after the 1997 reform presents a renewed figure which is far more 
plural than it used to be and which leads to an increased porosity with other worlds, as those of  finance 
or real  estate development.  It  has to be noticed that  the SNCF has evolved in a  similar  way with 
renewed relationships with customers or local authorities. If  this movement had partially begun before 
1997 – with the development of  regional trains for instance – the reform has clearly strengthened this  
dynamics.
Conclusion
As a result, the 1997 reform of  French railway can be considered as a creation of  many new borders, 
even if  on the cultural aspects, the erasing of  borders appears as its main effect. After 15 years, it has to 
be noticed that the world of  railways has deeply changed. Whether railway service is better or not is a 
highly complex point, but the diversity of  actors implied in railway management and projects has been 
increasing. First, with RFF and the railway regulation authority (ARAF5). Then with new operators, 
mainly on the freight market. Last with new kinds of  contracts in the development of  the network,  
such as the public-private partnership for the new Tours-Bordeaux high-speed line, which allows a  
private company to build and operate a national railway line, the first out of  the public sphere since  
1937. A sign of  the long-term dynamics opened by the 1997 law.
5 Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires.
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